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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH

CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC.,
a New Jersey Corporation,
Case No, 880453
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Priority No. 14(b)

VERA HESS PETERS
Defendant/Appellant
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT

Respondent, City Consumer Services, Inc., respectfully
submits this Supplemental Brief to the Court.
INTRODUCTION
Respondent was awarded summary judgment on its suit to
recover on an obligation evidenced by a promissory note.
Appellant brought this appeal alleging error on the part of the
trial court in granting summary judgment and awarding fees and
costs to respondent.

Both parties briefed the issues;

however, no oral argument has yet been allowed.

On May 3,

1990, the Court issued a decision reversing the trial court and
directing that respondent's complaint be dismissed.
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The basis

stated for the Court's decision was that respondent had failed
to bring its action within the three month period required by
section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated.

On May 15, 1990, the

Court recalled the decision issued on May 3, 1990.

At the

request of both parties, the Court has allowed the filing of
supplemental briefs.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Argument that Section 57-1-32 Applies to a

Junior Lienholder Whose Collateral Has Been Lost Is
Inconsistent with the Plain Language of the Statute and
Weil-Established Precedent of the Court.
The Court's recalled decision centered on an
application of section 57-1-32.

Section 57-1-32 provides:

At any time within three months after
any sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon
the obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security, and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount
of the indebtedness which was secured by
such trust deed, the amount for which such
property was sold, and the fair market value
thereof at the date of sale. Before
rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value at the date of sale of the
property sold. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorneys fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale. In any
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action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect its costs and reasonable attorneys
fees incurred in bringing an action under
this section,
(Emphasis added.)
As the emphasized phrases plainly indicate, and as
pointed out succinctly by the Utah Court of Appeals in G. Adams
Ltd. Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah App. 1989),
this section governs a deficiency action brought by a holder of
a note secured by a trust deed after the holder has completed a
non-judicial foreclosure under the trust deed.

It was never

intended to apply to the holder of a note without collateral or
to a holder of a note whose collateral was eliminated through
no fault of the holder.
The plain language of the statute is that "any sale of
property under a^ trust deed" commences the period for bringing
an action on the "obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security."

The complaint for such an action must set forth

the "amount of the indebtedness secured by such trust deed."
Only a distorted reading of the statute supports its
application to respondent's action on a note.

For the statute

to take on the meaning found in the Court's recalled decision
would, at the very least, require the addition of the word
"any" before the words "trust deed" in the second line.
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Absent

that addition, the statute clearly applies only to a holder of
a note who foreclosed non-judicially on the trust deed securing
the note.
Further evidence of the fact that section 57-1-32
applies only to a holder of a note who has foreclosed
non-judicially on the trust deed securing the note can be found
in the second and third sentences of the section.

If the

section was intended to require the holder of any note secured
by a trust deed to bring a deficiency action within three
months after the foreclosure of any other holder's trust deed
on the same property, the present language concerning the fair
market value and the amount of the indebtedness would make no
sense.
Respondent brought suit against appellant under the
terms of its promissory note.

Its collateral having been lost,

respondent was not governed by the "one-action" rule found in
section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated.

Lockhart Co. v.

Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983); Utah Mortgage
and Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980), Cache Valley
Banking Co. v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936).

In Cache Valley,

the Court stated:
... where the security has been lost through
no fault of the mortgagee, an action may be
maintained directly upon the personal
obligation evidenced by the note without
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going through the idle and fruitless
procedure of foreclosure.
56 P.2d at 1049.
As a result of appellant's breach of her obligation to
a senior lienholder, a foreclosure sale eliminated Respondent's
security.

Accordingly, as a holder of a note in default,

respondent was entitled to sue on the note at any time within
the applicable statute of limitations.

Respondent did not

predicate its claim for appellant's liability under the Note on
section 57-1-32.1
The Court's recalled decision stated that appellant
argued that respondent's action was time-barred by section
57-1-32:
Peters filed her opposition to the motion
and her own motion to dismiss, arguing that
CCS did not bring its suit under the
one-action rule, Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1
(1987), and failed to bring a deficiency
action under section 57-1-32 within three
months after the foreclosure sale.
Slip Opinion at 2.

lr

rhe only reference to section 57-1-32 by respondent was for
purposes of analogy in supporting its claim for attorney fees.
Respondent was entitled to its fees under the express terms of
the note.
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That statement was wrong.

Appellant did not contend

that respondent's claim was barred by the three month
limitation.

Appellant relied on section 57-1-32 for the

limited purpose of arguing that it required respondent to
either cure the senior lien default and conduct its own
foreclosure or take action to bid at the senior lien
foreclosure sale. Only thereafter, argued appellant, could
respondent seek a deficiency, if any.

Nowhere did appellant

suggest that plaintiff's suit was barred for failure to be
brought within three months after the foreclosure sale under
the senior lien.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13.)

The Court repeatedly cited to Concepts, Inc. v. First
Security Realty, 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1986) in support of its
recalled decision.

The Court's reliance was misplaced.

As the Durbano decision clearly states, the Concepts
case involved an attempt by the holder of a trust deed to hold
a second foreclosure sale in order to avail itself of the
deficiency action under section 57-1-32.

The Concepts case did

not involve a junior lienholder seeking to recover on its note
after its collateral was lost by the foreclosure of a senior
lien.

Rather, it dealt with an effort by a senior lienholder

to get around the three month limitation period after
discovering that it failed to bring a timely action after
foreclosing its trust deed.
Court's recalled decision.

Concepts does not support the
In fact, as noted in Durbano:
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The [Concepts] opinion merely observes in
passing that section 57-1-32 "requires an
action to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security to be commenced within
three months after the sale of the property
under the trust deed.
782 P.2d at 964.

It has nothing to say about the situation of

a junior lienholder suing on a note after its collateral is
eliminated.
II.

The Court's Recalled Decision Would Create

Dangerous Loopholes That Could be Used to Defeat the Interests
of Legitimate Lienholders.
The Court's recalled decision contains the following
statement:
The law is equally applicable to all
trust deed holders whether in a senior or
junior position, and an action for a
deficiency judgment after any sale of
property under a trust deed must be brought
within the strictures of section 57-1-32.
Slip Opinion at 3-4.

A literal application of this statement

would serve, in many cases, to penalize innocent parties and
allow those with legitimate obligations to escape
responsibility for those obligations.
There are numerous examples of the "mischief" that
could result from the Court's recalled decision.
examples is given in the Durbano decision.

One of those

The junior

lienholder whose note is kept current during the foreclosure of
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a senior lien may not be able to accelerate its own
obligation.

It would, then, be faced with the choice of either

losing its ability to recover a deficiency or expending funds
to cure or payoff the senior lien, without the ability to
foreclose its own lien.

Other examples are equally troublesome.

Consider a trust deed borrower who sells his home to
another individual and receives, as a part of the
consideration, a "wrap-around" second trust deed and note.

If

the home declines in value (a real possibility, as the past few
years have demonstrated) and the purchaser fails to pay on the
second note, the borrower/holder of the second note could
foreclose on the second trust deed and continue paying the
senior lienholder for three months after foreclosing on the
second.

Then, the borrower/holder could discontinue paying on

the obligation to the senior lien holder without risk of a
deficiency claim.

This is possible without notice to the

holder of the senior obligation!
Yet another example would involve a lender which makes
a business loan, requires a guarantee of its repayment, and the
guaranty is secured by a junior lien on the guarantor's home.
It is entirely conceivable that a senior lienholder could
foreclose on the guarantor's home at a time when the business
loan is not in default.

The lender is faced with the dilemma
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of either advancing funds to cure or payoff the senior lien or
losing its right to pursue the guaranty if the business loan is
not paid.
Surely the statute was not intended to give these
results.

Yet, the language of the Court's recalled decision,

strictly applied, leads to that conclusion.
Ill. The Negative Implications of the Court's Recalled
Decision on Financial Institutions and Individuals Holding
Trust Deeds Warrants the Benefit of Oral Argument.
Rule 29, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides,
in part:
a.
In General. Oral argument will be allowed
in all cases unless the Court concludes:
(1)

The appeal is frivolous; or

(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues
has been recently authoritatively decided; or
(3) The facts and legal arguments are
adeguately presented in the briefs and record and
the decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.
The Court issued its recalled Per Curiam decision in
this case without the benefit of oral argument.

The basis for

the Court's decision, i.e., that respondent's Complaint is
time-barred, was not advanced by the appellant.
addressed in either party's brief.

-9-

It was not

Given the possibility of significant departure from
existing law (see Durbano), the Court should seek the benefit
of oral argument.

In addition, the Court should consider the

benefits of allowing any interested entities or individuals to
address the issue raised by the Court in amicus curiae briefs.
Respondent's counsel has been contacted by several groups and
individuals interested in filing amicus curiae briefs.
IV.

The Appellant Waived Her Right to Assert a

Defense Based Upon the Limitations Period in Section 57-1-32.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P.") 8(c)
provides that a responsive pleading must set forth any matter
"constituting an avoidance or an affirmative defense."

Rule

12(h), U.R.C.P., provides that a party "waives all defenses . .
. which [he or she] does not present either by motion . . . or
. . . in [his or her] answer or reply. . . . "
"The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as
an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading or it is
waived."

Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company,

664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983).
The use of the limitations period found in section
57-1-32 to bar respondent's claim would certainly constitute an
"affirmative defense", as it bars liability not because the
facts don't entitle respondent to judgment, but because
respondent's claim is time-barred.

To preserve that defense,

appellant should have raised it in her responsive pleadings at
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the trial level.

Having failed to do so, she has waived the

right to argue it now.
V.

Defenses Not Raised Below Cannot be Considered

for the First Time on Appeal.
The Court's recalled decision was based on an
application of the 3 month statute of limitations found in
section 57-1-32.
her pleadings.

The appellant never asserted that defense in
She never raised the defense in argument before

the trial court.

She never even raised the issue in her brief

filed with this Court.
Appellant's only reliance on section 57-1-32 can be
found on pages 12 and 13 of appellant's brief.

There,

appellant cites section 57-1-32 for the proposition that
respondent was not entitled to a deficiency judgment because
the value of the property on the date of the sale exceeded the
amount of the indebtedness.

The appellant never argued below

that the three month limitation in section 57-1-32 bars the
respondent's claim.
It would be error for this Court to decide this case
on an issue not raised at trial or in the pleadings.

Matters

not raised in the pleadings or at trial cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal.

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938,

944 (Utah 1987); Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754,
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758 (Utah 1984); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah
1983); and Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981).
In both Bangerter and Villeneuve, the Court upheld summary
judgments in favor of respondents, citing this long-standing
rule.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN RESPONDENT'S
ORIGINAL BRIEF
Summary judgment was properly granted be Low where the
record establishes that the facts were uncontroverted.
Respondent filed a memorandum setting forth fifteen undisputed
material facts supporting its motion for summary judgment.
Additionally, respondent filed the affidavit of Kathleen
Hackett, the person then responsible for the delinquent account
of appellant.

Hackett stated that after reviewing the

appraisal of the property's value, the amounts due on the
existing liens and the carrying costs and costs of
reconditioning and marketing, respondent decided not to bid at
the senior lienholder's foreclosure sale.

Omitted citations can be found in respondent's original
brief.
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Appellant failed to file opposing affidavits.

Utah

case law requires opposing affidavits to avoid summary judgment
where the moving party has established facts supporting a
summary disposition of the case.

By failing to controvert the

facts established by Kathleen Hacketfs affidavit, appellant
left the lower court to decide only whether respondent was
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Even assuming

arguendo, that some facts were in dispute, there were no
material issues of fact precluding the lower court from
granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment as a
Matter of law.

Respondent's claim does not violate the

"One-Action Rule".

The facts are undisputed that respondent

did not use up the security.
security,

It also did not release the

Rather, the evidence supports the trial court's

conclusion:
That rule [the one-action rule] is not
applicable in this case, There was a
senior lien foreclosure of the property
on June 22, 1987. The plaintiff did
not bid at the sale because it made the
judgment that there was not an economic
justification for doing so. After the
sale there was no property to foreclose
on. The plaintiff was not required to
go through a fruitless procedure.
Uncontroverted evidence establishes that the "One-Action Rule"
is inapplicable because the senior lienholder foreclosed,
eliminating respondent's interest.
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the "One-Action Rule" is
applicable, the evidence establishes that the exception to the
"One-Action Rule" is controlling in this case.

The purpose of

the rule is to protect debtors from multitudinous lawsuits.
That protection is unnecessary and the rule is inapplicable
when the security has been lost or disposed of without fault or
blameworthy conduct on the part of the creditor.

The facts

clearly establish that the senior lienholder foreclosed, and
eliminated respondent's junior lien.
this action to recover on the debt.

Respondent then initiated
Respondent eLected not to

bid at the foreclosure sale due to its belief that there was no
"real" equity remaining for it to satisfy the Note.

Respondent

engaged in a careful review of the situation and made a
reasonable decision under the circumstances.

Surely those

actions could not be considered as fault or blameworthy conduct.
The trial court properly awarded fees and costs to
respondent.

The parties stipulated to the costs to be included

in the judgment, and the lower court heard evidence and
adjusted an hourly billing rate in making a determination on
the reasonableness of the claimed attorneys* fees.

The facts

clearly show that the trial court carefully weighed all the
facts and circumstances in awarding costs and fee's.

-14-

Absent a

clear abuse of discretion, this court should not disturb the
trial court's judgment.
CONCLUSION
The uncontroverted facts before the lower court
warranted its entry of summary judgment in favor of the
respondent.
decision.

The Court erred in rendering its recalled
To avoid continuing error and to avoid the undesired

results permitted by that decision, the Court should affirm the
lower court's decision.
DATED this 1st day of August, 1990.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By
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J . ffco6t Lundtferg
A t t o r n e y s for Respond
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